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At the heart of music therapy research, as in any field, is a search for knowledge. For centuries, 
researchers in a remarkable range of disciplines have conducted research and published 
findings in a vast array of professional journals and books. It therefore seems reasonable to 
suppose that we ought to know by now how to go about conducting research, and more 
importantly what it means to have gained knowledge. Yet problems have persisted along the 
way and have at various times proven quite challenging and even inconvenient for researchers 
and their claims to knowledge (Kuhn, 2012). Of particular significance are philosophical beliefs 
regarding what actually constitutes legitimate knowledge and how knowledge can be gained, 
or in other words beliefs about what can be known and how we can know it (Alvesson & 
Sköldberg, 2009; Denzin & Lincoln, 2003; Pascale, 2011). These are questions of ontology and 
epistemology. 
 
Ontology and Epistemology 
 
Ontology is the study of being, of the nature of existence. Said other ways, it is the study of 
what exists, what is in reality, what is real, or in Crotty’s simplest form, “what is” (1998, p. 10). 
Ontological beliefs, or assumptions in philosophy parlance, shape the types of questions a 
researcher might pursue about how the world works or how people act or interact. For 
example, in the natural sciences, key assumptions about reality fall under the ontology of 
realism. Realism holds that a reality exists outside of our consciousness of it and that certain 
fixed laws of nature—that is, given relationships between phenomena—are permanent fixtures 
of that reality, for instance the laws of gravity (Madill, 2008). Once discovered, these laws are 
considered true and reliable toward explaining the natural world. Alternatively, idealist 
ontology holds that we humans construct experiences of reality in our minds through thoughts 
and ideas, individually and/or collectively, and that that reality is open to all varieties of 
interpretation—there are no fixed laws about how reality may be or how it may be experienced. 
Further, in opposition to the realist perspective, in idealism it is precisely our consciousness that 
brings reality into being (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009; Giacomini, 2010).  
 Intimately related to ontology (what can be known) is epistemology. An epistemology is 
a theory of knowledge concerning beliefs about “how phenomena [can] come to be known” 
(Giacomini, 2010, p. 131); that is, how valid knowledge is produced. Pascale (2011) elaborates 
that epistemology is concerned with “the nature, sources, and limits of knowledge,” and that it 
Hiller 100 
provides “a justificatory account of the scientific production of knowledge” (p. 4, italics original). 
Said differently yet, epistemology addresses how we come to know that which we believe we 
know. As with ontology, a researcher might approach the pursuit of knowledge through a 
range of different epistemologies. Each epistemology rests on its own variety of assumptions 
(theoretical beliefs) regarding the nature of the relationship between a researcher and the 
subject(s) of research—between the knower and the known. Therefore, in research with human 
beings, such as in music therapy treatment studies, there are always dynamics at work between 
the researcher and those under investigation that result in a researcher’s access to different sorts 
of knowledge; for example, objective versus interpretive knowledge or distantly observed 
versus relational knowledge. Whether and how such dynamics are accounted for is important 
for a consumer of research to clearly comprehend the processes that led to the findings and then 
to most effectively apply the findings to practice.  
Epistemological assumptions are reflected in the theoretical perspectives, methodology, 
and methods of research studies. In other words, depending on a researcher’s beliefs about 
what can be known (ontology) and how to approach coming to know it (epistemology), 
different decisions will be made toward designing an effective study. These decisions are 
grounded in a theoretical perspective; in essence, an encapsulation of philosophical assumptions 
that form a cohesive way of viewing relationships between the sorts of knowledge we seek and 
what must be done to produce it. Thus, a theoretical perspective provides an explanatory stance 
for our pursuits and our actions. Methodology is sometimes referred to as a framework “of 
logically related means and ends to guide … research design” (Giacomini, 2010, p. 129) or as the 
supporting rationale for decisions made in designing methods for data collection and analysis, 
whereas methods are the hands–on procedures or actions used to gather and analyze data 
(Crotty, 1998). 
So what might be the benefit of bringing the concept of epistemology to our attention in 
a book about research? Isn’t epistemology the realm of philosophy? To be sure, concepts such as 
epistemology, ontology, axiology (values brought into a study), and methodology are 
fundamental aspects of philosophical thinking in our never–ending pursuit of knowledge about 
the world and our place in it. Yet the fact that research is a highly significant avenue of 
knowledge acquisition means that philosophical foundations are always implicated; every 
research question, every methodological decision, every procedure, every data analysis has a 
philosophical and theoretical origin (Crotty, 1998; Pascale, 2011). Understanding the 
epistemological assumptions that guide a research study means that the reader/consumer of 
the research can either more deeply understand the findings or can more knowledgably 
challenge the findings and the processes that led to them. Either situation is beneficial to the 
nature of the research process itself and to its eventual application to real–life circumstances—
which undoubtedly is the hope of all researchers. 
As noted above, epistemological assumptions provide justification for research decisions 
and indicate beliefs regarding the relationship between the knower and the known—that is, 
between the researcher and those under investigation. Interpretivist researchers tend to include 
fairly explicit, and sometimes rather elaborate, explanations of their ontological, 
epistemological, cultural, professional, and personal positions and values with regard to a topic 
at hand (Aigen, 1995). Such information supports the integrity of the research, reveals 
motivations and therefore potential biases related to the research project, and assists readers to 
best understand how they might apply findings in their own contexts (p. 294). Historically in 
objectivist research, however, the researchers’ beliefs and positions relative to a research topic 
are more often than not left undisclosed, if in fact they receive the researcher’s reflection at all 
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(Pascale, 2011, pp. 4–5). Failure to disclose epistemological assumptions in objectivist research is 
in part due to the fact that researchers are typically trained in data collection methods and 
analysis techniques without attention to the underlying philosophical foundations for why 
these might lead to knowledge of a particular sort (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). In essence, 
students inherit a value of ignorance of the necessity to articulate epistemological assumptions 
in objectivist research reports (Pascale, 2011, p. 5). For those trained only in objectivist research 
models (often referred to as quantitative research), realist ontology and objectivist epistemology 
and methods have come to be considered simply “commonsense,” requiring no judgment as to 
their legitimacy as aspects of knowledge and knowledge acquisition processes (p. 4). 
Consequently, the reasoning behind objectivist approaches to data gathering and analysis is left 
largely unexplained and readers are to simply accept that sound philosophical and theoretical 
foundations were applied. The ethical situation as regards objectivist research, therefore, is one 
wherein research processes, including method decisions, are rendered unapproachable to 
critical challenges. How can that which is considered commonsense be challenged as possibly 
invalid or flawed? Pascale explains: 
 
Processes of research, which are rendered as matters of common sense, are not 
easily available to doubt or critique. This is true in part because these 
assumptions are implicit, but also because common sense prepares one to think 
about the world in particular ways by excluding some topics from consideration, 
while making others appear obvious. (Pascale, 2011, p. 4) 
 
The situation is made more challenging and intractable if the broader community of 
researchers responsible for holding each other accountable for producing exceptional and 
creative research (e.g., editorial committees and editors) accepts reports lacking epistemological 
justification due to shared commonsense beliefs (Aigen, 2008; Edwards, 2012). Critical evaluation 
of situations where traditional methods might actually fail to serve the welfare of participants, 
either in the moment of research engagement or after the fact in its findings is obviously 
essential. As Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) stress, “Interplay between philosophical ideas and 
empirical work marks high-quality … research” (p. 10). We might add that a researcher’s 
openness to expanded views of methodologies and methods allows for exercising of greater 
creativity in the research process; a value that may lead to positive innovations (p. 274). 
The purpose of the present chapter is to highlight a small sample of epistemologies from 
objectivist and interpretivist research paradigms that inform music therapy research. We’ll 
begin, however, with a brief exploration of what has been the dominant epistemology for social 
and human science researchers as well as for music therapists, namely positivism and its 
somewhat more liberal revision known as postpositivism. For music therapy, the tenets of 
positivism continue to shape much of the extant published research literature, at least that 
produced in the U.S. Yet as will be noted, the tenets of positivism impose serious limitations to 
knowledge acquisition when applied to the study of human beings and their health promotion 
via music processes.  
 
Objectivist and Interpretivist Research and the Study of Human Beings 
 
During the past 200 years or so, a variety of epistemologies evolved in and through the human 
and social sciences via critiques of positivism and the objectivist stance that is foundational to 
its assumptions about reality, knowledge, and knowledge production (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; 
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Madill, 2008). As reviewed below, positivism is the theoretical perspective from which research 
methods of the natural sciences originate, arguably providing the most well-known processes 
for apprehending and comprehending the natural world—that is, the world of objects. 
Objectivism as an epistemology assumes a realist ontology, meaning that a reality exists out there, 
whether we are conscious of it or not, and that discovering the truth about that reality is best 
achieved through an accumulation of carefully planned observations. More basically, 
objectivism holds that we may come to know the truth about reality through repeated 
observations of it in highly controlled situations. 
Positivism, as an objectivist research perspective, undergirded most human and social 
science research throughout the 19th and into the 20th century and still has impact in the 21st 
(Pascale, 2011). Positivism is a philosophical system of knowledge that only accepts observable 
or measurable (i.e., empirical) experiences of the world as data for analysis, the findings from 
which are considered positive or absolute truths about reality. Researchers thereby treat persons 
whom they study no differently than objects, believing that the truth of individuals’ 
experiences, including interpersonal and social experiences, can be studied objectively (p. 8). A 
long held belief is that particular laws of nature exist—that is, cause–effect statements—
regarding the workings of the human psychological and social worlds and that through careful 
observation these laws could be discovered and truths about humans and how they function 
thereby explained (Crotty, 1998). Critiques of positivism occurred due to the realization that 
human beings are by nature vastly different subjects of study than the objects and workings of 
the natural world in which they live. Humans are beings who possess minds and bodies and 
who use minds and bodies to exercise will and individual capacities of judgment and action—
that which we might refer to as one’s agency (Pascale, 2011). Consequently, the meanings of 
human actions and how these might be understood created important challenges for 
researchers. These realizations quite obviously presented very different problems for 
researchers of human beings than for researchers of the natural world, and therefore called for 
different approaches to the then dominant positivist–objectivist viewpoint. 
Out of severe and unrelenting social science critiques of positivism emerged alternate 
theoretical perspectives. An alternative that remains anchored securely in much of positivist 
epistemology and methods, but with a less rigid stance on the veracity of knowledge claims 
offered, is postpositivism. A postpositivist theoretical perspective allows that, regardless of a 
researcher’s faithful adherence to objectivist scientific methods, findings are not considered 
absolute truths but rather are conjectural and circumstantial (Phillips & Burbules, 2000).  
Particularly during the second half of the 20th century, as reevaluations of 
epistemological views ensued, philosophical and ethical concerns for addressing research 
participants’ capacities for thinking, feeling, and acting—factors unaccounted for in mainstream 
objectivist social and human sciences research—were stressed (Pascale, 2011). Humans, it was 
emphasized, make their own meanings both individually and collectively via consciousness, 
agency, and sociality. Such meanings are valid slices of reality, even if wholly subjective in 
nature for those experiencing them, and are not simply awaiting observation by an external, 
objective researcher to be realized. Recognition that these deeply human aspects were 
unaccounted for in most human science research led to an ongoing search for ways to give voice 
to meanings belonging to research participants. Even the voices of researchers themselves, who 
were previously avowed to remain objective and distant from their objects of study, were 
reconsidered as potentially informative in knowledge production rather than contaminants to 
the process (pp. 30–32).  
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Through the ongoing critique of positivism, researchers turned toward interpretive 
frameworks. Interpretivism holds that humans construct knowledge as they interpret their 
experiences of and in the world; rejecting the objectivist notion that knowledge is simply there 
to be identified and collected (Constantino, 2008; Pascale, 2011). From an interpretive 
perspective, all knowledge is grounded in our particular experiences; it is subjective and bound 
to the natural contexts in which we enact our lives and is thus ontologically relativist (Alvesson 
& Sköldberg, 2009; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Greene, 2010). Therefore, interpretive knowledge is 
also imbued with our values, local and political, and is thus not universal and not generalizable 
in the sense that it may readily apply to other agents in alternate situations. Pascale (2011) 
highlights the interpretivist belief that, “In order to understand a situation … researchers must 
understand the meanings the situation holds for the participants, not just their behaviors” (p. 23, 
italics original). Schwandt (2003) adds: “From an interpretivist point of view, what 
distinguishes human (social) action from the movement of physical objects is that the former is 
inherently meaningful. Thus, to understand a particular social action … the inquirer must grasp 
the meanings that constitute that action” (p. 296). 
In fact, in contrast to the positivist aim of explanation of causes and effects, understanding 
is the aim of interpretive approaches to knowledge; therefore, an accounting of the meanings 
ascribed by researchers and participants is required (Crotty, 1998; Schwandt, 2003). Meaningful 
interpretations of phenomena are considered constructions (also referred to as reconstructions) 
rather than simply representations of a given experience. Greene (2010) explains: 
 
Interpretivist knowledge comprises the reconstruction of inter–subjective 
meanings, the interpretive understanding of the meanings  humans construct in a 
given context and how these meanings interrelate  to form a whole. Any given 
interpretive reconstruction is idiographic, time– and place–bound; multiple 
reconstructions are pluralistic, divergent, even conflictual. (p. 68)  
 
Thus from the interpretivist perspective, knowledge constructions are understandings 
from inside the meanings of participants and therefore also embody those persons’ contextual 
meanings. In other words, an interpretivist researcher seeks to gain access to the developed 
meanings that participants bring to experiences and that entail the broad cultural and 
experiential worlds from which those individual’s perspectives and beliefs are formed. Yet 
these understandings also include the same breadth of meanings belonging to the researcher, 
for the researcher brings her or his own world of beliefs and experiences to the interpretive 
process. Hence, knowledge is co–created or intersubjective—produced through the interactions 
of the researcher and study participants. Evaluations of understandings are reliant on 
assumptions of internal consistency and coherence among the various meanings represented 
rather than through correspondence between a researcher’s descriptions of an observed reality 
and the purported reality itself (Constantino, 2008; Green, 2010).  
 As indicated above, interpretivist knowledge is idiographic and relative to the situations 
and persons from which it emerges. No interpretation is privileged over another; no 
interpretation is a definitive one. The question, then, of how a discipline builds a base of 
knowledge via interpretivist research will inevitably be posed. In response, Greene (2010) likens 
interpretive knowledge to “context–specific working hypotheses” rather than absolute or even 
probabilistic propositions, as in the attempted generalizations of positivism or postpositivism, 
respectively (p. 68). Greene then introduces Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) evaluative notion of 
transferability, which places responsibility for applications of interpretivist knowledge in the 
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hands of practitioners who can most meaningfully use it, given their intimate understandings of 
the contexts and people with whom they work. The researcher, on the other hand, is charged 
with providing detailed and well–articulated (thick) description of contextual information 
associated with the study and its participants in order for a practitioner to meaningfully enact 
transfer. Successful transferability is possible due largely to the fact that interpretivist research 
is conducted in the natural settings of participants (p. 70). Ways to achieve understanding of 
meanings—of interpreting—contribute to the various delineations of approaches found in 
interpretivist research and the philosophies that support them. Examples include grounded 
theory, constructivism, social constructionism, ethnomethodology, hermeneutics, and 
variations of phenomenology.  
 
Evolving Music Therapy Research Paradigms 
 
Music therapists in the mid–20th century responded to an ongoing need and responsibility to 
systematically explore and communicate about the therapeutic benefits of music experiences for 
human healing, growth, and development. Since its inception, at least in the U.S., the organized 
music therapy profession has sought to gain acceptance from the dominant medical professions. 
To do so, music therapy researchers embraced the paradigm of the medical establishment, 
which was and is today dominated by objectivist epistemology and positivist/postpositivist 
perspectives and methods. Hence, music therapy researchers continue to try to uncover truths 
about how clients respond to music through repeated, controlled observations in settings that 
often infuse typical clinical scenarios with laboratory–like interactions, and, as in earlier social 
science research that was based on positivist values, music therapy research participants’ 
capacities as human agents with minds and bodies, wills and desires, thoughts, feelings, and 
individualized meanings have largely been deemphasized in service to an objectivist 
epistemology. It was not until the 1980s that music therapy researchers with an eye toward 
more fully accounting for participants’ experiences began to explore alternate epistemologies 
and to apply non–positivist frameworks and methods for collecting and analyzing data (Aigen, 
2008; Wheeler & Kenny, 2005). An interpretivist epistemology (sometimes referred to as the 
qualitative paradigm) undergirds these alternate approaches that first included grounded 
theory, naturalistic inquiry, and phenomenology, and have since expanded to also include 
methodologies such as action research, arts–based research, discourse analysis, ethnography, 
first–person research, hermeneutic inquiry, morphological research, narrative inquiry, 
participatory action research, and qualitative (interpretivist) case studies (O’Callaghan, 2009; 
Wheeler, 2005).  
Bruscia (2005) clarifies that objectivist and interpretivist research methods are employed 
to pursue very different sorts of questions. Objectivist research is valuable in pursuing 
questions wherein generalizable truths are sought via explanations of cause–effect relationships 
between specific variables. Interpretivist research, on the other hand, is suited to pursuing 
questions regarding “the lived world of human beings and how that world is subjectively 
constituted, construed, and made meaningful by individuals and groups” (p. 83). 
Methodologies and methods brought to bear in both paradigms are founded upon ontological 
and epistemological beliefs, assumptions, and commitments. When these are reflected upon, 
enacted through careful decision making while conducting the study, and clearly articulated in 
the final document, consumers of research are helped to more fully comprehend the processes 
undertaken and therefore the potential benefits of the findings.  
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 What follows are descriptions of objectivist and interpretivist research methodologies 
with explanations of related epistemological assumptions and beliefs. Included are positivism 
and postpositivism, constructivism and social constructionism, phenomenology, and 
hermeneutics. For each methodology, a study from the music therapy literature is described 
and analyzed so as to highlight and explicate how particular epistemological commitments 
were manifested via the design decisions made and the methods employed, and that ultimately 
led to the findings offered.  
 
Objectivist Research Epistemologies 
 
Research methodologies described below adhere to an objectivist epistemological perspective 
and include positivism and the closely related perspective of postpositivism. These are the 
primary methodologies that employ objectivist epistemological assumptions and reflect a 
perspective wherein a researcher controls all possible variables and interactions of those 
variables in order to explain the nature of the cause–effect relationships witnessed. A realist 
perspective and objectivity are considered essential aspects of such knowledge pursuits.  
 
Positivism and Postpositivism 
 
For nearly 400 years, positivism has been the dominant perspective for what has been 
understood to be science and scientific investigation (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). The root of 
positivism is a belief in objectivity as the cornerstone of knowledge and knowledge acquisition. 
An objectivist stance accepts as ontologically true the notion of a singular reality existing 
independently of humans’ experience of it, and that it is possible to increasingly know this 
extant reality empirically through the senses (or via measurement devices that substitute for 
observation). Thus, the meanings of observed objects or phenomena are believed to be in those 
objects or phenomena; they exist before a researcher intentionally accesses them through 
observation methods. For instance, from this viewpoint, a tree in a field is a tree, with all of the 
understandings of what a tree means that goes with it (e.g., wood for fire and furniture, shade, 
leaves to rake, the provision of a higher viewpoint than from the ground) regardless of whether 
a human happens upon it or not. 
Positivism is the perspective held in natural science research that has as its focus 
explanation of cause–effect relationships between inanimate objects (e.g., rocks, trees, and 
planets) and/or natural phenomena (e.g., gravity, rainstorms, and earthquakes). Positivist 
research can thus provide glimpses of a reality wherein mechanistic cause–and–effect events 
occur predictably, relevant variables can be controlled, data are value–neutral, and unequivocal 
truths may thereby be revealed (Giacomini, 2010). Explanations (theories) that are well–
warranted by analyzed data are considered general laws about the relationships observed 
between or among phenomena (Phillips & Burbles, 2000, p. 4). This means that predictions are 
possible about the nature of how the world and people in it function. A key positivist claim is 
that the process of objectively and systematically observing, describing, and analyzing specific 
aspects of reality leads to facts—the way things are—that are value–neutral; that is, research 
processes and results are uncontaminated by a researcher’s values, perspectives, or opinions 
(Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009; Fox, 2008).  
Findings in positivist and postpositivist research are based on inductive inference or 
hypothetico–deductive processes. Inductive inference entails inferring “general conclusions 
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(e.g., laws, descriptive categories) from particular phenomena (i.e., data observations). 
Inductive inference involves repeated empirical observations of similar phenomena, to make 
conclusions about their shared nature” (Giacomini, 2010, p. 131). In contrast, hypothetico–
deductive processes, also known as hypothesis testing or falsification, seek to prove or 
disprove theoretically true statements through controlled experiments. The most typical 
procedures used to uncover the truths sought by positivist and postpositivist researchers 
include: establishing hypotheses (theoretically–grounded guesses) about the sorts of cause–
effect relationships that can be discovered, creating operational definitions to specify precisely 
what is relevant to observe, controlling variables that might interfere with observing the 
operationally defined phenomena, gathering relevant observations or measurements (data), and 
analyzing the data, most often through statistical processes. These procedures, considered 
classic scientific methods, reveal relationships and the nature of relationships (causes and 
effects) believed to be present in phenomena and thereby provide explanatory knowledge. Strict 
control and structure of the process allows for the belief that a researcher’s observations do not 
alter the phenomena observed in any way. Hence, the researcher’s identity, values, cultural 
context, reasons for carrying out the study, and relationship to the phenomena under 
investigation are believed to have no (or minimal) impact on the data, provided the proper 
controls are upheld, and therefore the data are a value–free, true representation of reality. 
Application of statistical procedures for data analysis to determine whether results are likely to 
have occurred by chance also theoretically removes the possibility of a researcher’s values, 
including speculations or desires about outcomes having an influence on eventual findings. 
Conclusions are thus considered factual, accurate, verifiable, positive, true knowledge (Crotty, 
1998; Ruud, 2005).  
 As noted above, postpositivism grew out of critiques of positivism and its 
foundationalist perspective on knowledge. Foundationalism holds that knowledge uncovered 
through research is absolute and securely founded (established) in sensorial experience 
(observation) and/or indisputable reason (Phillips & Burbules, 2000). Postpositivists 
understood that these sorts of claims, particularly when applied to research with human beings 
and societies, were faulty and required adaptation. The need for a perspective that accounts for 
the obvious inconclusiveness of all truth claims was recognized.  
Postpositivism retains some established beliefs and values from positivism while 
altering others. Postpositivism maintains ontological belief in the objective nature of reality but 
recognizes that undertaking to know objective reality will always be deficient due in part to the 
limitations of our human capacities. Therefore, what we come to know is considered incomplete 
and imperfect and will (and should) be revised in light of new evidence (Phillips & Burbules, 
2000). Whereas the positivist ideal of seeking absolute truth is worthily maintained, achieving 
the best-warranted, highly probable explanations of phenomena is the postpositivist agenda 
(Fox, 2008; Phillips & Burbules, 2000).  
In practice, postpositivists maintain belief in the power of the data gathering methods 
applied by positivist researchers, but findings are considered conjectural rather than absolute 
and are admittedly bound to certain conditions rather than comprehensive (Phillips & Burbules, 
2000). Clark (1998) explains, “The contextually bound nature of research findings, consequential 
in acknowledgement of researcher and theoretical biases, warrants that knowledge deemed to 
be ‘truthful’ under postpositivistic inquiry is not universally generalizable to all cases and all 
situations” (p. 1246). Yet the ideal of generalizable truth findings remains the paramount aim of 
postpositivist research. 
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Phillips and Burbules (2000) report that critiques of positivism as an epistemological 
stance from which to conduct meaningful research in the human and social sciences have 
rendered this position all but abandoned by researchers, yet many of its tenets live on through 
the postpositivist perspective. Therefore, for the remainder of this chapter we shall refer to 
postpositivism as the prevalent objectivist methodology. 
Below, we will analyze a music therapy study designed according to postpositivist 
epistemological commitments. The purpose of this review is to make transparent certain choices 
related to design and enactment relative to postpositivist assumptions, in order to bring 
attention to issues surrounding their application in research with human beings. As noted 
earlier, some objectivist epistemological stances and their manifestations in design and 
implementation are considered common sense and thus immune to critique or even explanation 
(Pascale, 2011). However, philosophical transparency in research reporting may greatly enhance 
readers’ ability to fully comprehend and apply relevant findings in clinical work or future 
research (Edwards, 2012; Pascale, 2011). This particular analysis is lengthier than the subsequent 
analyses of interpretivist studies because postpositivist studies draw on a fairly specific and 
detailed batch of procedural decisions and actions that necessitate explanatory attention, while, 
in contrast, interpretivist studies tend toward transparency with regard to their epistemological 
underpinnings and method development and therefore typically require less explanatory detail. 
Postpositivist methodological concepts analyzed below include statements of 
hypotheses, sample characteristics, operational definitions, data collection and analysis, and 
generalization of findings. 
 
A Music Therapy Research Example. In the selected example (Cevasco 2010), a 
therapist’s nonverbal behavior relative to research participants’ affect and participation during 
music activities was examined. The purpose of the study was to determine cause–effect 
relationships between four treatment conditions and participants’ participation and affect 
response rates. Research participants were 38 older adult nursing facility residents with 
Alzheimer’s disease and related disorders (ADRD) in five care facilities. The participants were 
separated into seven distinct groups, each of which underwent a 45-minute session. The 
treatment conditions were implemented by a single therapist, presumably the researcher. The 
treatment conditions included when the researcher–therapist (a) altered her affect and physical 
proximity to the participants while leading varied music activities, (b) altered facial affect only, 
(c) altered proximity only, and (d) used no altered affect or proximity (that is, stood still and 
purposely evinced no natural alteration of affect). Music therapy methods used were (a) 
movement to recorded instrumental music in accordance with modeled movements and verbal 
instructions, (b) singing of songs with modeled vocalizations and guitar accompaniment, and 
(c) rhythm imitation exercises wherein participants copied modeled rhythms on handheld 
percussion instruments. The sequences of music methods presented during the seven singular 
sessions were predetermined rather than determined in response to participant needs or 
emergent responses in the moment. Given the predetermination of the researcher–therapist as 
leader (the researcher was not the residents’ usual music therapist), the predetermination of the 
music therapy methods used and their sequence, and the rigidity of the treatment conditions, 
the environment in which the research took place does not seem characteristic of an authentic 
music therapy treatment process but rather has much in common with a laboratory–like 
situation  
Four music activities per method occurred each session, each facilitated with a different 
treatment condition. Thus 12 music encounters were undertaken per session. Whereas rationale 
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was provided for choices of music to support movement activities and rhythmic materials for 
instrumental imitation exercises, rationale for selection of specific song material was not except 
to state that the music was believed to be familiar to the participants. Descriptions were not 
provided of the character of the live music presented nor of the participants’ musical responses. 
Sessions were observed and the rates of participants’ affective and participatory responses 
recorded by student assistants who also rated responses evident in limited videotape footage. 
Data were collected via a time sample rate of every 15 seconds. Statistical analyses were 
conducted and conclusions articulated, indicating differences in response rates to the different 
experimental conditions imposed on the groups. 
Analysis of postpositivist epistemological commitments in this study reveals that, while not 
explicitly stated, the study was designed in accordance with these epistemological assumptions. 
Hypotheses are not explicitly stated, yet the researcher–therapist’s predictions can be inferred 
from the introductory material and subsequent design: specific nonmusical actions by the 
researcher–therapist will lead to specific participant nonmusical responses (cause–effect 
relationships). Sampling criteria are not clearly outlined; however, basic criteria can be 
discerned as male and female older adults with Alzheimer’s disease who live in a nursing 
facility. No mention is made regarding randomization of participants into groups. Participants’ 
individual characteristics are unaccounted for. Providing no information about the individual 
participants (e.g., cultural contexts and life experiences) infers an assumption that individual 
differences (e.g., sex, personality, life experiences, cultural background, musical background) 
were non–confounding variables and thus were irrelevant to the types of responses sought. 
Irrespective of the de–emphasis of participants’ individual characteristics, according to the 
postpositivist notion of generalization, findings from this study are assumed to apply to all 
persons fitting the basic criteria noted above. 
The unstated ontological assumptions are foundational and realist. Foundationalism is 
inferred from the case made in the related literature section supporting possible cause–effect 
relationships between the independent and dependent variables via predominantly objectivist 
research findings from music therapy and non–music disciplines. A realist view is inferred 
through the stated belief that persons with Alzheimer’s disease respond to particular stimuli in 
specific ways and that these responses have stable meanings that are imbedded in the responses 
themselves. In other words, given the controlled study design, the meanings of participant 
responses are believed to be present in the responses themselves and are given; they already 
exist and are not based on the researcher’s interpretations. Hence, the objectivist assumption is 
that one only needs to observe and track responses in order to gain knowledge about them. 
Specifically, for this study, enacting affect (the act of smiling) and participation (exerting effort 
within music activities) are held to mean that participants’ are somehow in a greater state of 
well–being when such behaviors are present than when they are not.  
Epistemologically speaking, postpositivist study designs typically develop or identify 
and report highly specific operational definitions of independent and dependent variables in 
order to reduce the possibilities of extraneous phenomena interfering with the particular 
responses under investigation. Operational definitions also focus data collectors’ observations 
on the exclusive responses sought by the researcher and not on other events that might occur, 
regardless of their potential clinical significance. In this study, procedural aspects of the 
independent variables (how and when the treatment conditions were enacted) were described 
in detail, along with brief descriptions of the researcher–therapist’s facial affect and relative 
proximity to the participants demonstrated during each condition. Of significance is that 
characterizations of the live and recorded music presented—aspects essential to understanding 
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the interpersonal and inter–musical context through which the independent variables were 
experienced by the participants—are conspicuously absent. Neither the attributes of the 
therapist’s musical contributions nor those of the participants appear to have been considered 
relevant except, perhaps, as potentially confounding variables. The music activities appeared to 
serve only as environmental contexts for manipulating nonmusical variables. The music itself as 
a stimulus or as a medium of interaction seems inconsequential.  
The four treatment conditions (independent variables) were predetermined and were 
reportedly not altered in nature or sequence during sessions regardless of the nature of 
participants’ responses in the moment. The condition wherein the researcher–therapist used 
both affect and proximity seems most similar to actual music therapy engagement processes, 
whereas the others do not. Precise monitoring of applications of the independent variables was 
not conducted, potentially compromising the study’s internal validity. Regardless, attempting 
to maximally control for the character of independent variables applied is in this case based on 
the objectivist assumption that it is possible to add or withdraw certain aspects of natural 
human interaction processes in order to study those remaining. Further, from a postpositivist 
perspective, it is believed that the observed responses to the reduced interactions are 
nonetheless valid representations of participants’ interactional functioning. Design decisions 
that attempt to maintain the most natural environment possible for participants are reportedly 
valued in postpositivist research (Guba & Lincoln, 2005; Phillips & Burbules, 2000). Yet tightly 
controlling interaction variables, in essence, introduces contrivances or artificiality into 
interactional processes. This is a long–standing concern and challenge regarding objectivist 
research approaches in the human sciences, impacting the balance between internal and 
external validity (i.e., generalizability; Phillips & Burbules, 2000; Prickett, 2005).  
Reducing the independent and dependent variables and their relationships to one or a 
few concrete behaviors, as in this study, is congruent with the objectivist assumption that 
discrete human responses can be isolated, manipulated, and explained. From the postpositivist 
perspective, however, these participants’ unique individual and socio–historical contexts (e.g., 
personality, emotionality, cultural influences, musical history) are of no relevance to the 
observed, operationally defined responses sought. Similarly, the researcher–therapist’s 
individual context is believed irrelevant to the interactions between the independent and 
dependent variables. The unstated postpositivist concept explaining this irrelevance is that the 
existence of unique human attributes is controlled for, accomplished by believing that the 
participants’ unique human contextual factors are spread throughout the groups and are 
therefore of little or no influence on the findings (a statistical concern), and that the researcher–
therapist’s unique attributes are minimized in their influence by limiting her actions to just 
those relevant to the treatment conditions (a theoretical concern). Studying humans means 
studying highly complex beings with unique contexts, aspects that can be considered quite 
challenging, even inconvenient when addressing certain types of research questions. 
Postpositivist researchers deal with this challenge through various design decisions made in 
service to the methodology and the type of knowledge sought, such as the statistical control just 
mentioned. 
The two dependent variables in this study (alterations of affect and effort exerted to 
actively participate in music activities) were considered evidence of participants’ level of well–
being and are representative of the postpositivist concept of construct validity. As is typical in 
objectivist research, this predetermined meaning was imposed on the participants’ responses 
based on earlier objectivist study findings. Hence, neither participants nor their 
guardians/agents were consulted regarding alternate viewpoints. Atypical of postpositivist 
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methods, however, operational definitions of the dependent variables were not provided. 
Nonetheless, incidents of the dependent variables were reportedly observed and numerically 
accounted for by data collectors; the character or quality of responses, however, was not.  
From the postpositivist perspective, reducing data collectors’ perceptual focus toward 
interactions between the stated independent and dependent variables alone—regardless of the 
nature of the music or of the musical context in which the variables interacted—is intended to 
provide a level of certainty for capturing the presence of specific nonmusical cause–effect 
relationships. This also means, however, that other potentially important clinical phenomena 
are, by methodological necessity, left unaccounted for as factors that might influence the 
dependent variables or as clinically important events in their own right. This study design also 
seems to evince the postpositivist belief in the value of ascertaining predictability in cause–
effect relationships and that such relationships indeed exist among particular groups and are 
highly probable clinical truths to be applied to similar contexts. Designs that reduce phenomena 
quite narrowly are considered unproblematic and, in fact, are favored in objectivist models of 
research with human beings. 
Impartial data collectors tracked their in vivo and videotape observations of participant 
responses. Data points collected were subsequently turned into numerical units that were 
analyzed through statistical procedures. Here in the research process, the data points are 
believed to be true representations of the nature of reality regarding the phenomenon under 
investigation. The essential belief is that numerical data collection schemes of ostensibly 
unbiased evaluators (who undoubtedly possess human strengths and fallibilities) are 
considered unbiased evidence of the reality of another human being’s experience. Through 
statistical procedures, relationships between the frequencies of participants’ actions relevant to 
those of the researcher–therapist were calculated and the resulting numerical relationships 
submitted in the report. These numerical relationships are believed to accurately reveal the 
probability that participants’ responses are true reflections of ways that older men and women 
with Alzheimer’s disease exhibit or manifest well–being. Consequently, the probability 
statements from statistical analyses are described in the discussion section as the best currently 
warranted explanation of the phenomena surrounding these participants’ experiences. The 
article unequivocally states, “The results of this study indicate that a board–certified music 
therapist’s nonverbal behavior impacts the affect and participation of older adults with ADRD 
to a significant degree” (Cevasco, 2010, p. 295). 
 As noted earlier, our analysis of this study is intended to highlight the often unreported 
yet fundamental beliefs concealed within the process of conducting research with human beings 
through postpositivist epistemological commitments. A careful reading reveals that the 
researcher found the topic to be of great interest and believed that benefit would come to 
participants in a nursing facility and their music therapists from the explanations of cause–effect 
relationships provided. Not atypically, the way the research question was set forth initially (e.g., 
“The effects of …”) revealed the researcher’s postpositivist epistemological stance. These 
epistemological assumptions subsequently foreshadowed the nature of the methodological 
procedures that would be undertaken. Pascale (2011) argues that postpositivist researchers tend 
to simply assume that traditional objectivist research methods, long established in the natural 
sciences, are the undisputed best ways to gain explanatory knowledge—even of the actions of 
human beings. Such methods are therefore not questioned but applied without explicitly 
accounting for their theoretical foundations (p. 46). Concerns about this lack of transparency are 
what led earlier human and social science researchers to seek alternate perspectives and to 
account for participants’ individuality, experiences, and potential meanings therein. Whereas 
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postpositivist research has value for approaching certain types of questions regarding human 
action, it is of benefit to readers to have access to explicit information regarding a researcher’s 
epistemological stance. Providing this information in a report also allows readers to hold 
researchers accountable for their decisions/choices and subsequent truth claims. Further, it 
allows readers of research to better evaluate the processes and findings reported and thus more 
carefully scrutinize potential applications of the knowledge gained—a primary reason why 
such research is conducted in the first place. For the benefit of the music therapy discipline, 
particularly with the current emphasis on evidence–based practice, objectivist researchers might 
assist the discipline by providing the most complete picture possible for how they acquired the 
knowledge they claim as evidence of effective clinical methods, procedures, and techniques. 
 
Interpretivist Research Epistemologies 
 
Research methodologies described below adhere to an interpretivist epistemological 
perspective and include constructivism/social constructionism, phenomenology, and 
hermeneutics. These methodologies reflect a perspective wherein an individual or group may 
ascribe meaning to phenomena or experiences based on encounters with actual objects and 
people—in other words, meanings that are empirically based encounters but explicitly 
understood through an individual’s or a group’s interpretations. Relativity and subjectivity are 
considered natural and expedient aspects of such knowledge pursuits.  
 
Constructivism and Social Constructionism 
 
Constructivism is a perspective that views meaningful human reality not as objective—not out 
there to be discovered or uncovered—but rather as constructed by individuals through their 
interactions with and interpretations of the world and each other (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009, 
Crotty, 1998). Crotty emphatically states, “There is no meaning without a mind” (pp. 8–9). 
However, meanings are not simply created in and from one’s mind, for that would indicate a 
pure form of subjectivism. Meanings emerge, rather, from constructions—or more accurately, 
reconstructions of our experiences of an empirical reality. There is a merging of object and 
subject; of first–hand experiences of reality and contextualized perceptions—“subject and object 
emerge as partners in the generation of meaning” (p. 9). Meanings are therefore impermanent 
and change when new experiences bring new perceptual elements and awarenesses (Schwandt, 
2003).  
Constructivism differs in focus from objectivist research epistemologies in that its aim is 
understanding phenomena through interpretive processes. These processes are intended to 
explicate meanings rather than explanations of causes and effects identified through distanced 
observation and subsequent description (Constantino, 2008; Schwandt, 2003). A focus on 
understanding is particularly relevant for studying human actions and interactions, for unlike 
the physical world, these are inherently and essentially meaningful (Schwandt, 2003, p. 296). 
From a constructivist view, it is the meanings (and meaning–making processes) that people 
ascribe to their experiences that are of greatest interest and these are internal processes that are 
context bound, unpredictable, and independent of natural laws. In fact, constructivists reject the 
very notion of natural laws with regard to human agency and meaning–making, believing 
rather that such processes are idiographic, individualized, and socio–historically context 
specific.  
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Constructivist research seeks to understand phenomena through the perceptions of 
those under investigation (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003). According to Guba and Lincoln (1994), 
constructivist research is epistemologically transactional and subjectivist: “The investigator and 
the object of investigation are assumed to be interactively linked so that the ‘findings’ are 
literally created as the investigation proceeds” (p. 111, italics in original). Meanings are explored 
between the experiences of a situated research participant and her or his life contexts and those 
of the researcher. Researchers working from a constructivist stance are interested not just in the 
experiences of participants but in the ways that participants construct meanings from and about 
their experiences. Constructivists believe that humans do not simply receive imprints of objects 
and events encountered in the world (facts), but rather interpret these through individualized 
perceptual schemas. In fact, Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) explain that phenomena are always 
interpreted in some way: “We never see single sense–data, but always interpreted data, data 
that are placed in a certain frame of reference” or perspective (p. 6). Thus, meanings ascribed 
from an individual’s interpretations are relative—they belong to the knower in that time, place, 
and cultural situation. Knowledge and the knower are thereby inseparable. Schwandt (2003) 
describes constructivism as a form of perspectivism, meaning that an individual sees or 
experiences a given phenomena through a particular lens; that is, a conceptual framework 
developed through enculturation and socialization processes that inform each individual’s 
personhood and interpretations of the world (p. 306). Accordingly, who I am, based on my life 
experiences, the contexts in which I live, and the language I use to describe my experiences 
matters to the potential meanings I construct and communicate about any given phenomenon. 
And the same goes for everyone else who experiences the same phenomenon (Crotty, 1998). In 
other words, there exist neither value–neutral perceptions nor singular, permanent truths. 
Instead, all perceptions are value–laden and truths are multiple and sometimes disparate and 
conflicting (Pascale, 2011).  
Research via the tenets of constructivism seeks understanding of the meanings that 
human participants ascribe to their experiences of a particular phenomenon. Studies are 
therefore conducted in the natural environments where phenomena of interest occur. Schwandt 
(1994) shares that Guba and Lincoln, early proponents of constructivist research methods, 
initially referred to their conceptions of constructivist methods as “naturalistic inquiry” (p. 128). 
Data generation methods used are those that provide opportunities for participants and 
researchers to articulate and share their meanings and meaning–making processes. From the 
constructivist perspective, human science data are not collected since they are not simply in 
existence and awaiting discovery, but are generated through interactive processes between 
researchers and participants (Mason, 1998, in Aasgaard, 2005). Participants’ and researchers’ 
uses of language are of great import. In fact constructivist research methods have direct lineages 
to conceptualizations of hermeneutics and phenomenology, which are highly reliant on 
linguistic processes of understanding (Constantino, 2008). Consequently, transcriptions of 
recordings of sessions, open–ended interviews, and narrative response open–ended 
questionnaires are often applied methods of data generation. Reconstructions of participant and 
researcher’s meanings are produced for analysis. From interpretive yet systematic analyses 
emerge varying levels of understanding of a particular phenomenon (Crotty, 1998). Evaluative 
criteria for the goodness of fit of linguistic reconstructions relative to the experiences under 
investigation are used as means of ascertaining credibility and trustworthiness (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2005).  
 Social constructionism embraces most of the philosophical factors described for the 
constructivist viewpoint such as a pursuit of understanding of meanings rather than 
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explanation of phenomena, the notion of knowledge as relative to a particular socio–historical 
situation, and the belief that meanings are multiple—no single interpretation is more 
authoritative than another. Crotty (1998) clarifies that in social constructionism, social has to do 
with seeking to understand the approaches to meaning–making that are used by groups in 
constructing knowledge rather than a pursuit of knowledge about social life. A principle 
difference between constructivism and social constructionism, then, is the belief that 
interpretations of meaningful reality are inter–subjectively co–constructed among persons who 
share a particular socio–historical context and language, rather than produced via an individual 
mind (Crotty, 1998; Pascale, 2011; Schwandt, 1994). Moreover, social constructionist thought 
holds that it is the transactional and subjective nature of interpersonal relations that bring 
reality and meanings into being. Thus interaction is essential for understanding both natural 
and social phenomena, and language is a primary medium through which such meanings are 
transacted and communicated dialogically (Crotty, 1998; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Schwandt, 
1994). Even the notion of one’s self is believed to be a social construction, emergent through 
social interactions and subject to ongoing change via new relationships, interactions, and 
dialogues (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). This means that knowledge about given phenomena 
not only bears traces from the many layers of culture belonging to human agents, but is in fact 
emergent from and because of those contextual/cultural attributes and experiences; “Social 
constructionism emphasizes the hold that culture has on us: it shapes the way in which we see 
things (even the way in which we feel things!) and gives us a quite definite view of the world” 
(Crotty, 1998, p. 58).   
 Guba and Lincoln (2005) characterize social constructionist ontology as “relativism—
local and specific co–constructed realities,” meaning, as indicated above, that interpretations of 
meaningful reality are context–specific and multiple, and may also be conflicting but 
nonetheless are potentially viable (p. 258). Epistemologically, given the transactional and 
subjective nature of co–constructed meanings, it is believed that the everyday processes 
involved in situated human living are the very processes that create meaningful realities and 
are therefore what a researcher must seek to understand in order to be involved in interpreting 
those emergent realities (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Schwandt, 1994). Gergen (1994) emphasizes 
that language itself, inherent in thought, feeling, and social processes, gains its capacity for 
meaning–making through the human interactions in which it is used. Therefore from the social 
constructivist view it is believed that we humans are in a constant state of meaning–making. 
Cultural–contextual influences shape our capacities for experiencing and making sense of our 
world and our interactions bring meanings about life into being. Further, the language we use 
to live out and describe our experiences is shaped by cultural–contextual factors and continues 
to evolve as we continue to use it. Consequently, our experiences and meanings also continue to 
evolve individually and collectively. It seems then that, according to social constructionism, 
meaning making through contextually grounded interpretations of our natural and social 
worlds is simply an occurrence of living in community (Berger & Luckmann, 1966).  
Constructivist epistemologies are relevant for music therapy researchers interested in 
exploring the meanings and meaning–making processes that emerge from clients and therapists 
during treatment. The very nature of these individualistic processes calls for an approach that is 
nondeterministic; that is, it does not assume predetermined categories of response. Rather, the 
approach taken should account for the ways that meanings emerge through the myriad sorts of 
actions and interactions that unfold during music therapy (Bruscia, 2005).  
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A Music Therapy Research Example. Aasgaard (2005) explores the meanings that 
Norwegian children who were hospitalized for cancer treatment ascribe to the song writing 
processes that they experienced with the music therapist–researcher as well as the songs 
composed therein. The study also includes perspectives of others who had any involvement 
with the song material after the songs had been composed such as family members, nurses, 
other patients, teachers, and journalists. This latter part of the study sought to understand the 
breadth of impact the songs had from years and sometimes great distances beyond the clinical 
times and spaces of their creation, referred to as the “song histories” (p. 71) 
An analysis of constructivist epistemological commitments in this example suggests that the 
researcher decided to conduct the study according to epistemological assumptions of 
constructivism due to beliefs about the highly individualized character of song writing as a 
form of personal and social process for children. The constructivist perspective further lent itself 
to exploring song histories as these are also social by nature in that song material produced by 
one person may affect others in numerous and unpredictable ways as the song is presented 
outside of its context of origin.  
In the hospital setting where the children were treated, song composition is a typical 
music therapy method in which to engage patients. The sample of five pediatric patients chosen 
for the study was purposefully made in order to acquire information relevant to the research 
focus. Each of the five children had already written at least one song during hospitalization 
when the study commenced. Children of a range of ages (4, 7, 7, 13, and 15 years) were chosen 
as a way to broaden the potential scope of perspectives explored. Nineteen songs in all were 
written. The sample of research participants was eventually expanded to include others who 
experienced the children’s song material in various ways, as described above. Examples of the 
numerous data sources accessed by the researcher include dedicated interviews, unplanned 
conversations, progress notes and case reports, diary entries from parents, music therapy 
students, the researcher himself, letters from patients, and news media, as well as the artifacts of 
the songs themselves in written and recorded forms.  
In emphasizing the individual nature of the patients’ experiences, Aasgaard (2005) 
notes, “There is no average paediatric cancer patient (as there is no average song). A child who 
participates in song creations is neither typical nor untypical in relation to anything” (p. 72). 
Thus, as understood from the constructivist perspective, each individual’s interpretations of 
and meanings ascribed to the songs and related experiences (e.g., composition processes, 
performances, recordings, presentations on television) are constructed through the influence of 
socio–historically evolved contexts. The researcher did not predetermine them nor are they of a 
generalizable or universal nature. The meanings described are therefore multiple. While not 
described explicitly as such, data analyses were carried out continually throughout the research 
process as new data and sources led to new insights that were accounted for in subsequent 
analyses. Analyses were thus conducted in a manner reminiscent of techniques applied in 
grounded theory studies (Amir, 2005). Accordingly with regard to the meanings that emerged 
for the children, Aasgaard identified and elaborated on the categories of expression 
(communicating with others), achievement (optimistic evolution of conceptualizations of self), 
and pleasure (hedonic value of engaging in creative acts) as highly relevant impacts of engaging 
in clinical song writing.  
The sorts of relativist, interactional, and interpretive knowledge produced through a 
constructivist study such as this one honors the perspectives of its many participants. The 
voices of pediatric cancer patients, their parents and extended family members, related 
professionals, the researcher, and others are treated inclusively toward understanding the 
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potential impacts of music therapy. Meanings emerged from the interpretive research processes, 
in contrast to an objectivist, hypothetico–deductive approach that would have imposed 
limitations on the range of possible response categories available for analysis. Aasgaard’s 
conclusions span a wide range of meanings and meaning–making processes that undoubtedly 
could not have been foreseen or predicted prior to the study, and indeed would not have come 
to light without the open and inclusive processes allowed for through constructivist 
epistemological assumptions. Conclusive findings were not sought, but rather the rich range of 
understandings that emerged over time is one indication of the usefulness of the study. How 
understandings from the study are applied is an issue of transferability as interested clinicians 
make use of them in their particular contexts. For certain sorts of questions, therefore, the 
constructivist perspective is useful as a process that opens a way for expanding possibilities of 
knowledge generation. Finally, in contrast to social constructionist methods, Aasgaard as the 
primary researcher was ultimately responsible for the categories constructed and that shaped 
final interpretations articulated for this study—that is, constructions of meanings. In the spirit of 
interpretivist research, Aasgaard (2005) reports, 
 
My role as a researcher includes understanding lay interpretations as well as 
developing relevant theoretical reflections about the song phenomena. … 
Interpretive conclusions by this researcher are not necessarily more true than 
those of other investigators (professional or  not) studying the same material; 
proposing well–founded answers and prolific questions are, however, major 
(and sufficient) goals here. (p. 80)  
 
Phenomenology 
 
Phenomenology, like the other interpretivist approaches discussed herein, has taken various 
turns in its evolution as a philosophical and methodological perspective, and therefore its 
epistemological underpinnings have also transformed over time. Depending on which tenets a 
phenomenologist embraces (which are themselves dependent on the object of study and how 
best to approach it) and how these are applied in knowledge production, focus on 
understandings to be gained may vary from aspects of human consciousness (transcendental 
phenomenology) to language (linguistic phenomenology) to processes of interpretation 
(hermeneutic phenomenology) to disciplinary concerns (experiential phenomenology) and to 
existential and ethical concerns (existential and ethical phenomenology, respectively; van 
Manen, 2011). At the core, phenomenological research seeks understanding of lived experiences 
and the meanings that emerge as individuals experience phenomena in their everyday lives—in 
the lifeworld. The lifeworld may be described as the context wherein an individual has meaning 
as a person as the result of enculturation and wherein meanings are made through perceptions, 
cognition, and language surrounding phenomena and experiences (Adams & van Manen, 2008).  
From the phenomenological perspective, and in stark contrast with realist and objectivist 
beliefs, humans are not understood as beings who simply inhabit a world, but rather are 
understood to be being–in–the–world. One’s being–ness is predicated upon the nature of the 
world in which one lives, and the nature and meaning of the world in which one lives is 
predicated on the interactions the individual has with that world. Thus, human consciousness is 
seen as inextricably linked to the experiences one has in the world, and likewise the world is 
seen as only meaningful through having been encountered by a conscious being who ascribes 
meaning to it. Consequently, the Cartesian dualist notion of a conscious subject who makes 
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sense of a distantly observed reality out there is undermined and the classic subject–object split 
vanishes (Crotty, 1998). From this phenomenological belief comes a key tenet of 
phenomenology referred to by Husserl as intentionality, referring to the intentional focus an 
individual exercises toward a phenomenon (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). Crotty (1998) 
articulates the resulting viewpoint thusly: “Consciousness is always consciousness of 
something. … We are beings–in–the–world. Because of this, we cannot be described apart from 
our world, just as our world—always a human world—cannot be described apart from us” (p. 
79). Therefore, lived experience is the object of study in phenomenology. 
Ontologically speaking, early phenomenological researchers sought to go beyond, or 
more accurately beneath descriptions of their own experiential meanings to identify essences of 
experiences—essences being foundational elements undergirding and making experiential 
meanings recognizable and unique to the experience of a given phenomenon (Adams & van 
Manen, 2008; Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). With regard to identifying a phenomenon’s essence, 
van Manen (1990) adds, “The essence or nature of an experience has been adequately described 
in language if the description reawakens or shows us the lived quality and significance of the 
experience in a fuller or deeper manner” (p. 10). 
Note that in earlier phenomenological research, the researcher studied her or his own 
experience—the immediacy of experience therefore being direct between the source of 
experience and the perceiver. The researcher then described and interpreted her or his own 
meanings. The process was subjective yet rigorous (Adams & van Manen, 2008). In modern 
phenomenology, researchers study, with equal rigor, the subjective experiences of others and 
the meaning–making processes they engage in within the contexts and cultural lifeworlds in 
which their experiences occur. Forinash and Grocke (2005) clarify different approaches when 
they refer to reflexive phenomenology and empirical phenomenology as research methodologies 
wherein researchers study their own experience of a phenomenon versus the described 
experiences of others, respectively (p. 323). 
Epistemologically, a phenomenological researcher studying experiences and meanings 
of phenomena believes that by engaging in a crucial process of bracketing, that is, setting in 
abeyance one’s own culturally mediated presuppositions and preconceptions regarding a 
phenomenon, it may be experienced anew—fresh and unadulterated. Behind the concept of 
bracketing is a theoretical understanding—or as Crotty describes it, a “suspicion” (1998, pp. 80–
81)—that our enculturation, while enriching of our lives and providing us with well learned 
and hopefully accurate perspectives on each other and the world, is also limiting with regard to 
what we see and how we comprehend phenomena. Our cultural foundations, including our 
language and thought processes, are not inclusive of all explanatory and expressive possibilities 
and perceptual attitudes. What we see and understand regarding phenomena are always 
filtered through a particular lens, limiting what and how we see, hear, touch, feel about, and 
make meaning of experiences. Significantly, the language we use to describe our experiences to 
ourselves (and to others) influences the character and the very nature of what we experience 
and share. According to phenomenological thought then, a good deal of the fullness, 
completeness, and/or richness of what may be experienced is limited due to not only our 
fallible human perceptual systems but also to the limitations of our representational systems. By 
setting aside our prior taken for granted meanings and through freshly and openly experiencing 
phenomena in a theoretically first–hand manner, we may come to new perspectives, or at least 
to changed perspectives understood as reinterpretations, or to new or newer meanings (pp. 82–
83). Yet the phenomenological researcher must experience, must be present and available to the 
phenomenon of interest for it is from the open, immediate, and subjective orientation to the 
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phenomenon that possibilities for understanding arise: “Subjectivity means that we are strong in 
our orientation to the object of study in a unique and personal way—while avoiding the danger of 
becoming arbitrary, self–indulgent, or of getting captivated and carried away by our 
unreflected preconceptions” (van Manen, 1990, p. 20; italics original). 
Procedurally, various levels of phenomenological reduction were developed with regard to 
a researcher’s lived experience and the invariant, universal essences therein. These reductions 
resulted in interpretations of the nature of how particular essences are constituted (Alvesson & 
Sköldberg, 2009, p. 77). 
Analysis of data generated in a phenomenological study is often closely tied to 
hermeneutic practices in that the researcher’s analyses most often deal with language via 
descriptions of experiences. Jackson (2016), in Chapter 41 of this book, provides a useful table 
comparing various approaches to analyzing linguistic data but note that a common 
characteristic is “that the interview protocols are distilled to a statement or essence that 
authentically reflects the experience” (p. 324). It is important to highlight again that, as with all 
aspects of interpretivist inquiry, analysis processes are not performed with an attitude of 
objectivity nor as inviolate protocols, but remain open and susceptible to variation in technique 
and sequence as meanings are revealed across analyses. Such is necessary in that not only are 
the data unique to the individual participants from which it was generated but that the 
researcher too, given her or his humanness and particular lifeworld, provides a unique point 
from which analyses takes place. Hence, phenomenological analysis procedures are indeed 
interpretive, but they are also rigorous but not rigid, creative but not arbitrary, and always 
focused on emergent meanings and the structures that enliven them (essences) rather than 
predetermined categories.  
In addition to analyzing language–based data, music therapy researchers might also 
seek to understand the meaning potentials of music created by clients or between client and 
therapist. A variety of analysis procedures are explicated in the music therapy literature for 
analyzing and/or interpreting music and musical interactions as phenomena of interest. A short 
list includes Amir (1990), Arnason (2002), Bruscia (1987, 2001), Ferrara (1984), Lee (2000), 
Pavlicevic (2000), Perry (2003), and Trondalen (2003). The following study by Markworth (2014) 
focused on the communicative nature of improvised music between client and therapist and is 
informative for explicating epistemological assumptions revelatory of a phenomenological 
attitude. The study entailed analyses of both language and music data.  
 
A Music Therapy Research Example. Markworth (2014) investigated the ways that 
improvised music provides a medium through which a non– or minimally verbal client and 
therapist communicate. Participants included a purposefully selected sample of three Nordoff–
Robbins music therapists whose videotape footage of sessions with three children on the autism 
spectrum (ages 3–6 years) was analyzed toward identifying essences of communicative 
meanings experienced between client and therapist. 
An analysis of phenomenological epistemological commitments reveals that the researcher 
employed a phenomenological approach due to the nature of the research questions posed, 
which in turn are based on the nature of the phenomenon of interest. In this case: “In what ways 
do children with autism engage in communicative interactions through the [co–improvised] 
music?” (a question for description), “How does the music therapist use improvised music to 
invite or elicit communication?” (a question for description and/or explanation), and finally 
“What seems to be communicated through the musical interactions?” (a question for 
interpretation; p. 7). The sorts of knowledge sought seem inferred through the research 
Hiller 118 
questions, as indicated in my parenthetical statements. The first two questions might have been 
approached through an objectivist methodology wherein the researcher would operationally 
define what communication in this context looks and sounds like, then would simply note the 
frequency and/or duration of such events as identified on the videotape footage. But such 
knowledge would be inadequate toward addressing the researcher’s stated true interest. Given 
the final research question then, it seems that Markworth ultimately wishes to know what the 
nature of the communicative musical interactions might be when they occur—that is, the kinds 
of communication that occur and the essence of these communicative acts. The researcher’s 
decision to work through an interpretivist methodology more closely aligned with the musical 
processes undergone by therapist and client and their experiences.  
The researcher leaves the reader with no doubt as to whether she believes that 
communication occurs between client and therapist via improvised music. As articulated in a 
section titled the Researcher’s Context, Markworth notes that in her own work with minimally 
verbal children with autism, she has “experienced the phenomenon of communicative 
interactions where music was the primary means for expression,” and adds, “I approached this 
research project with an existing expectation that music can be an effective vehicle for 
communication…” (p. 2). Description of the researcher’s context for pursuing the topic is a 
methodological procedure known as bracketing or epoché intended to make explicit the 
researcher’s preconceptions and beliefs about the phenomenon, and to thereby consciously hold 
these perspectives in abeyance during the study, allowing the data to be experienced freshly 
and hopefully leading to new or deeper knowledge about the phenomenon. By making 
preconceptions and beliefs explicit, a researcher, in the spirit of the phenomenological attitude, 
provides the reader the opportunity to judge whether the findings have been influenced by the 
researcher’s biases or not, thereby enhancing the trustworthiness of any eventual knowledge 
claims. 
Data were generated via analysis procedures adapted from Lee’s (2000) approach to 
analyzing clinical music improvisations and included the verbalized perspectives of both the 
researcher and the participant–music therapists about the music and the interactions. 
Procedurally, Markworth first reviewed the videotape footage alone, “listening, writing out 
music transcriptions, and documenting observations and personal perceptions of the 
communicative interactions between the client and therapist” (p. 9). The initial review also 
included indexing (time markers) meaningful events in the sessions. In the second stage, a 
preliminary analysis of the researcher’s impressions from the music transcriptions and written 
documentation led to identification of emergent themes revelatory of meaningful groups of 
musical interactions. In the third stage, semi–structured interviews with the music therapists 
while reviewing their respective videotape footage were conducted, guided in part by the 
researcher’s initial discoveries from the music transcriptions and themes. The interviews were 
audio–recorded and transcribed. In the fourth stage, direct quotes from participants specifically 
linked to indexed events on the videotapes were charted as were themes that emerged from 
these statements. As the analysis process unfolded, a chart was created including indexed 
events, the researcher’s observations, initial themes, participant–therapists’ statements, and 
themes relevant to therapist quotes. Thus it became possible to compare perspectives of both 
researcher and therapists across meaningful events. In the last stage of analysis, a 
comprehensive list of themes was created and synthesized into categories.  
A careful examination of the synthesized list of categories relevant to the question of 
communication through clinically improvised music led to identification of two general 
perspectives surrounding method (musical techniques used) and meaning (communicative 
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content) of communication, but these essential aspects required greater specificity in order to 
integrate all of the data. A subsequent return to the raw data allowed for more useful coding of 
thematic ideas into the interrelated themes of Music Language, Musical Expression, and Music 
as Shared Experience for which the earlier identified perspectives of method and meaning are 
described as essential (p. 13). After providing a detailed account of the nature of these themes 
along with narrative descriptions linking the musical transcriptions and verbal data that 
support their inherent relationships to the processes of communication, Markworth follows 
through by further connecting prior research and theoretical conceptions that are coherent with 
her findings.  
From an interpretivist epistemological perspective, Markworth drew on a particular set 
of assumptions and beliefs to guide the research process, as well as to enhance the 
trustworthiness of the data and emergent understandings. For example, understandings 
emerged for the researcher from experiences interacting with the videotape footage rather than 
attempting to fit observations into predetermined categories; multiple perspectives were clearly 
valued in that a synthesis of researcher and therapists’ views was embraced rather than relying 
on the researcher’s or the therapists’ meanings alone; and analysis of data was an ongoing 
endeavor, revealing openness to new or alternative interpretations (meanings) that were 
allowed to inform both the process and the findings. It is also important to emphasize that 
knowledge gained through this phenomenological study were heavily reliant on concepts 
drawn from hermeneutics wherein interpretations of the texts of both verbal and musical 
natures figure prominently due to the experiential phenomena under investigation. As noted 
previously, hermeneutics and phenomenology have long standing ties. It might also be noted 
that, whereas Markworth classified her study as related to transcendental phenomenology 
(study of consciousness), we might also relate it to reflexive phenomenology (study of 
researcher’s own experiences) as well as to empirical phenomenology (study of the experiences 
of others), as both sources of data and meaning–making were relevant. Such borrowing across 
varied related areas of research is not at all uncommon in interpretivist research, particularly in 
light of the fact that it is the research question (supported by ontological and epistemological 
beliefs) that determines the methods used in pursuit of understandings. 
 
Hermeneutics 
 
The world of hermeneutic study is enormous and far ranging. Therefore the topic is here 
considerably delimited in order to work within the length and scope of the present book. The 
form of hermeneutics examined below for its epistemological assumptions is referred to by 
Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) as alethic hermeneutics in reference to the notion that this type 
of research seeks to reveal something that is hidden in a given phenomenon. Such an approach 
leads to deeper understanding than meets the eye during our typical daily routines of 
interpreting and making meaning of our worlds (p. 96). 
Hermeneutics has had a long history and complex evolutionary process among 
interpretivist approaches. Its origins reach back to ancient Greece (Crotty, 1998). What follows, 
therefore, are some general concepts relevant to understanding basic epistemological 
assumptions foundational to current hermeneutic research practices. Hermeneutics as “the art 
and science of interpretation” (Kenny, Jahn-Langenberg, & Loewy, 2005, p. 335) was developed 
by early Protestant scholars for interpreting ancient religious texts and by early humanists to 
study classic texts (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). Thus from the beginning, language, linguistic 
meanings, and interpretive processes were and continue to be of great import. In current 
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hermeneutic thought, the ways that humans use language to describe experiences influences the 
ways that such experiences are perceived and understood. Our language, as a system of 
symbols, thus shapes what we see and how we see our realities and interpret their meanings 
(Crotty, 1998, p. 88). Expanded perspectives of what constitutes a text occurred mostly during 
the 20th century, leading to a perspective that construes human actions, art works, and speech as 
forms of texts and therefore susceptible to interpretive hermeneutic inquiry (Kenny, Jahn-
Langenberg, & Loewy, 2005). Modern hermeneutic studies, therefore, take as objects human 
experience(s) and the individual and collective meanings that humans ascribe to these. More 
broadly, Crotty tells us that hermeneutics has been applied toward “human practices, human 
events, and human situations—in an attempt to ‘read’ these in ways that bring understanding” 
(p. 87). Such human practices, events, and situations are believed to be meaningful symbols 
available for interpretation. Hermeneutics joins other interpretive perspectives in rejecting the 
objectivist and foundationalist tenets of positivism, seeing them as unsuitable to address 
questions outside of the natural sciences and wholly inappropriate for inquiry into human 
affairs (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009; Freeman, 2008).  
 Hermeneutics has as its aim understanding meanings underlying human experiences, in 
contrast to, for instance, postpositivist explanations of causal relationships regarding 
phenomena or phenomenological pursuits of essences of objects, events, and experiences 
(Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009; Forinash & Grocke, 2005). Moreover, rather than seeking to 
establish law–like statements of causes and effects between phenomena, hermeneutics rejects 
the existence of such laws (Freeman, 2008). And, although hermeneutic practices (like 
phenomenological studies) are retrospective in nature (meaning that researchers and 
participants reflect back upon events, experiences, and texts that have already transpired or 
come to be), rather than seeking essences (invariant/universal structures extant at the core of 
given experiences), hermeneutics seeks to interpret meanings regarding these phenomena. From 
a hermeneutic perspective, understanding itself is even a process of continually coming closer 
to true understandings, but that fully incontrovertible understandings or truths are not 
achievable for many reasons, not the least of which is the imprecise and ever changing nature of 
the language with which we represent experiences and meanings to ourselves and others.  
 Current hermeneutic practices, as might be applied in music therapy research, seek to 
understand the processes whereby humans ascribe meanings to their experiences. Foci are on 
the linguistically described experiences of those who are studied, their actions, and the products 
of their actions (e.g., creations of art or music), as well as the experience of the researcher in the 
process—and significantly, the confluence of all of these (Crotty, 1998; Freeman, 2008). To gain 
understanding of another’s experience requires comprehending and empathizing with the 
contexts (historical and present) in which the other lives and through which their meanings 
emerge and are shaped. But such comprehension is not enough. The researcher needs also to 
draw from her or his own self–understandings and contexts in order to interpret the contexts, 
actions, artifacts, and meanings of the other. These various parts—that is, the people studied, 
their historical and cultural contexts, their actions, artworks, and linguistic descriptions of their 
experiences, as well as the researcher’s contexts, experiences, artworks, and language—are 
perceived as a whole. These contextual aspects (the parts) as constitutive of the totality of a given 
experience of interest (the whole) form the elements for the methodological analysis process 
known as the hermeneutic circle. Understandings are achieved and transformed into new and 
deeper understandings through engaging in an ongoing cycle of analytic movement between 
the parts and the whole and back again. The parts can only be understood in their relation to 
the whole and the whole can only be understood in its relation to the parts. Knowledge gained 
Epistemological Foundations 121 
from working back and forth via the hermeneutic circle was earlier believed to close the gap 
between explanation and understanding (Crotty, 1998). More current conceptualizations 
emphasize a gap between pre–understanding (those understandings that are already in place 
for us through the processes of living; that is, being in the world [Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009, p. 
117]) and new understandings, meaning the gap between what a researcher brings to a study in 
terms of tacit knowledge and beliefs about a phenomenon and those that emerge through 
analysis processes. Of consequence is the fact that through the process of back and forth 
movement between one’s pre–understandings and new understandings, one’s horizon of 
meanings (that is, one’s perceptual context) is also changed. Therefore how one comes to 
understand also continually changes—and the same goes for research participants’ horizons of 
meaning. A fusion of horizons thus occurs through interactions between the researcher’s 
meanings and those of participants, thereby enriching potential interpretations and 
understandings of each (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009, pp. 120–121).  
 Epistemologically speaking, the processes of hermeneutic knowledge production, then, 
are recollective (recalling of experience), self–reflective (researcher and participants’ 
awarenesses of self at various levels regarding the focus of a study), socio–historical (meanings 
are time, place, and cultural context specific), collective (attempts are made to integrate 
meanings), empathic (attempts are made to understand the experience of the other), intuitive 
(applications of tacit and imaginative ways of knowing), and ultimately interpretive (Alvesson 
& Sköldberg, 2009). Alvesson and Sköldberg stress the importance of intuition and empathy in 
the interpretive process: 
  
The idea is that in the last instance the mind of one individual—especially its 
more creative, non–rule–bound aspects—is not accessible to the reason of 
another individual, trying to analyze it from the outside; only intuition can fully 
assimilate the mental universe of another human being. In so far as this empathy 
is complemented by the interpreter’s broader or at least different stock of 
knowledge, is it possible—and this constitutes one of the main theses of 
hermeneutics—for interpreters to understand agents better than the agents 
understand themselves. (p. 93) 
  
 For music therapy, hermeneutic inquiries might, for example, seek understanding of 
how clients make meaning of their experiences of music, of musical processes (e.g., 
improvising, composing, re–creating, listening), of the therapist, or of aspects of the therapy 
situation itself. The researchers in the study example below sought to understand meanings 
ascribed by independent listeners exposed to recordings of piano improvisations that were 
created during therapy by abandoned and traumatized children. The children were living in 
residential care away from their families. Understanding was also sought of the children’s 
verbalizations about their improvisations as well as those of the therapist–researcher. In this 
case, the texts analyzed included recordings, verbal descriptions, and transcriptions of the 
improvisations. In a contrasting way, the researchers might have used hermeneutic inquiry as a 
way to study the actual processes of improvising that the children experienced or the 
experiences of the independent listeners as they learned of the true life histories of the children 
whose improvisations they heard and what the music may therefore have meant in treatment. 
In any of these situations, it is the texts—in whatever form they might take—that a researcher 
analyzes through her or his particular horizon of meaning, alongside that of the participants, 
toward uncovering potential meanings. 
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A Music Therapy Research Example. Amir and Yair (2008) used hermeneutic 
processes to analyze the following data: (a) three recorded piano improvisations, one each from 
three Israeli children living in a residential care setting (two females and one male, ages 5.5, 7, 
and 8 years, respectively); (b) verbal descriptions of the improvisations provided by 
independent listener/describers (a math student, a business student, and a music student 
interested in attending a music therapy graduate program), a professional pianist who 
transcribed and musically analyzed and commented on the improvisations, the 
therapist/researcher, and the children themselves; and (c) the analysis of the music 
transcriptions. The authors noted that they drew from phenomenological as well as 
hermeneutic methodologies in designing and carrying out the study, and noted the close 
relationship (historically and methodologically) of phenomenological and hermeneutic 
approaches to research. However, the primary emphasis of the study was on analyzing the 
verbal descriptions provided by the various participants and the meanings to be potentially 
uncovered through these textual materials. Further, the researchers drew transparently from 
their own intuitions and pre–understandings regarding the children and clinical musicing prior 
to formal analyses of the various texts rather than attempting to suspend their beliefs about the 
phenomenon under investigation as in a phenomenological study (Forinash & Grocke, 2005). 
Therefore the study is considered principally hermeneutic in nature, drawing on interpretive 
data that lends itself to hermeneutic analysis as well as pursuing the uncovering or discovering 
of hidden meanings. 
An analysis of hermeneutic epistemological commitments in this study suggests that the 
researchers’ epistemological assumptions, which in part guided research design decisions, are 
themselves uncovered through analyzing the text of this article. The researchers state clearly the 
assumption that the children possess continuously developing inner worlds that are shaped 
through life experiences, and that these inner worlds can be accessed in part via interpreting the 
children’s words (albeit this aspect—the texts of the children’s verbalizations—was found to be 
limited in these particular children). The researchers state the assumption that the children’s 
improvisations also provide a form of text or “musical narrative” (Amir & Yair, 2008, p. 134) for 
analysis:  
 
Based on the assumption that a musical improvisation represents the client’s 
inner world (Amir, 2004), and that one can find meanings in musical 
improvisations via verbal language and the use of images, metaphors and 
stories, it can be said that in the present study, the three improvisations tell the 
clients’ stories. (Amir & Yair, 2008, p. 133) 
 
 Acquiring knowledge about the children’s inner worlds transpired by studying the 
children’s verbal descriptions of their experiences while listening to their improvisations as well 
as on revelations from interpretations of the improvisations themselves. It is apparent in the 
report that interpretations of the improvisations are based on the belief that the music can 
symbolically transmit meanings relevant to the children’s experiences and therefore to their 
inner (hidden) worlds: “We can conclude that the analysis showed the ability of the music to 
mirror the clients’ inner experiences and represent the clients’ clinical profiles” (Amir & Yair, 
2008, p. 133). 
The researchers based procedures for collecting the independent listener’s 
interpretations of the improvisations on an interesting assumption steeped in valuing 
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interpretive (hermeneutic) processes. The explicitly stated assumption is that the listener’s 
verbalized interpretations could, in essence, serve as or be the voices of/for the children whose 
own interpretive statements were considered by the researchers to be limited toward richly 
describing their experiences (Amir & Yair, 2008, p. 120). Hence an additional, apparently 
unexpected level of meaning was inferred in the analysis—the meaning reflected in the 
listeners’ voices as surrogates for the children’s voices. The listener’s interpretations included 
words and phrases characterized as qualities of different sorts to describe evoked scenes and 
images, emotions heard in the music, and emotions evoked from the music listening. The 
listener’s verbalizations included many metaphors that were considered coherent with the ways 
that the improvisations unfolded musically and were found to be quite consistent between all 
participants. Rather than seeking some form of evidence that might correspond to the words or 
music as a means of justifying findings (as in objectivist research), the notion of coherence among 
the various interpretations guided the analyses. The idea of coherence among interpretations of 
the meaning–makers (participants) leaves open the possibilities of many and varied 
interpretations that may lead to new insights and deeper understandings, but never to 
deterministic and/or validated truths. The notion of coherence also speaks to the 
epistemological belief in the value of shared or collective meanings. The researchers applied 
analysis procedures to all of the participant’s interpretations toward uncovering potential 
meanings rather than predetermining the sorts of categorical meanings that might be 
discovered. The researchers explain: 
 
Our intention was not to generalize the findings. … We believe that this kind of 
qualitative inquiry allowed us to discover a more holistic picture which was 
composed of the meanings derived while listening to the improvisations of 
these children. Our interest was to look for shared meanings and not to examine 
which factors affected which other factors. (Amir & Yair, 2008, pp. 135–136) 
 
Research findings relevant to the epistemological assumptions noted were supported in 
the report by other researchers’ findings from the literature but also significantly by Amir’s and 
Yair’s past experiences and intuitions about these children and the value of clinical music 
improvisation. As noted above, making transparent how one’s pre–understandings and 
intuitions shape decisions regarding methodology and analysis and lead to deeper 
understandings is fundamental to modern hermeneutic research, and clearly distinguishes it 
epistemologically from the objectivist–positivistic approaches previously described. In this 
instance, the authors report in their discussion of the findings: “Although the general picture 
confirmed what we already knew based on our intuition and experience, we found some of the 
findings to be meaningful” (Amir & Yair, 2008, p. 132). 
 
Implications 
 
Objectivist epistemological beliefs regarding knowledge and knowledge acquisition through 
research have been fundamental for centuries. Researchers of music therapy embraced these 
beliefs during much of the 20th century. Methods of data gathering and analyses in objectivist 
research have in some sense become ubiquitous in terms of their application toward 
explanatory knowledge—simply commonsense, as emphasized by Pascale (2011). Thus the 
nature of how objectivist research is carried out changes very little from study to study. 
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Predictability of method, it is believed, begets a high level of predictability that a realist and 
objective sort of knowledge will be discovered. Interpretivist epistemological beliefs, on the 
other hand, support research processes that are intentionally malleable and subject to numerous 
changes within a study as emergent findings come to light. Recall that in interpretivist research, 
data analysis is often an ongoing process from the initial point of data generation through to the 
end. Researchers are free to draw ideas and methods from alternate frameworks as the 
researcher’s experience and understanding of the data suggests. As an interpretivist 
researcher’s understandings grow within a study, alterations in how subsequent data are 
generated and analyzed may change as well in order to more fully understand the phenomenon 
of interest. In fact, analysis might lead a researcher to draw from a different methodology from 
the one in which the study began. Hermeneutic researchers may draw from grounded theorists, 
constructivist researchers may draw from phenomenologists, and so on. Thus a form of cross–
methodology sharing may and often does occur potentially leading to not only a deeper 
understanding of the particular phenomenon under investigation but perhaps also to 
development of new comprehensive methodologies (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). Hence, 
interpretivist research continues to grow as humans continue to pursue more useful ways of 
understanding each other and how we all experience the world we live in.  
 Emphasized repeatedly in this chapter is the notion that epistemology matters in the 
process of undertaking and understanding research. For the music therapy researcher, 
understanding one’s epistemological beliefs as they relate to the myriad forms of phenomena 
that occur in music therapy is essential to formulating the most appropriate research questions, 
determining the most useful approach or methodology through which to study a phenomenon, 
and designing the most useful methods and analysis procedures to answer one’s questions. For 
just as there are different types of knowledge one might wish to gain, there are different ways of 
coming to know each. Objectivist and interpretivist epistemologies provide the foundations 
from which varying pursuits of knowledge occur. Yet researchers are often not educated about 
the foundational facets undergirding research work. Researchers are taught how to but not 
why—the methods but not the supporting philosophical and theoretical bases for them (Pascale, 
2011).  
 
Academic institutions tend to offer research courses that are focused on 
techniques for data collection–often without significant philosophical 
consideration. Yet research paradigms offer scholars and students more than 
simple orientations for data collection and analysis. They provide frameworks 
for recognizing what we see, as well as for  understanding the relevance and 
importance of what we see. Without understanding the theoretical 
underpinnings of social research methods, we are reduced to taking what is 
often referred to as a “cookbook approach” {Hesse–Biber & Leavy, 2006} to 
research that inevitably precludes a deeply critical stance. (Pascale, 2011, pp. 24–
25) 
 
A lack of reporting philosophical foundations is often more prevalent in objectivist 
research for reasons articulated previously, but the issue is one that should be of concern to 
interpretivist researchers as well. Consumers of music therapy research who seek to learn from 
and apply findings in real life music therapy treatment (as called for in the current climate of 
evidence–based practice) deserve to have the full picture when examining a study; not just how 
the study was conducted but, equally as important, why each step was taken. It is with this 
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contextual knowledge that clinicians are best able to evaluate and apply findings to benefit 
clients.  
By understanding and embracing the now greatly expanded range of valuable 
epistemologies and methodological frameworks available, music therapy researchers can 
expand the possibilities for the types of questions they pursue and the approaches they apply. 
Undoubtedly such expansion will lead to much more clinically relevant and useful research to 
fill our journals and texts and thereby the minds of present and future music therapists.  
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